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Abstract
The political theorist William Galston argues that the liberal political tradition 
contains two distinct strands of philosophical thought.  One emphasizes the principle of 
autonomy, while the other stresses the principle of diversity.  These principles, according to 
Galston, are in tension with each other and as guiding criterions lead to quite different 
public policies.  Autonomy-centered liberalism seeks to promote autonomy or “individual 
self-direction”; it reflects a “commitment to sustained rational examination of self, others, 
and social practices.”  As such, autonomy-centered liberals are generally suspicious of 
religious belief and seek to confine it to the private sphere.  Diversity-centered liberalism, 
on the other hand, seeks to maximize the public space (legally, institutionally, and 
culturally) in which different individuals and groups can live out their differences, limited 
only by the demands of liberal social unity.  
Although Galston does not focus on constitutional law, his explanation of the 
different conceptions of the liberal political tradition and the place of religion in it raises the 
question of the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence 
can be explained by the autonomy-diversity dichotomy he has drawn.  That is, just as 
autonomy-centered liberalism seeks to confine religion to the private sphere, so too has 
much of the Supreme Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence.  The question arises then 
as to whether the Supreme Court’s effort to limit the public role of religion has been driven 
by an understanding of the liberal political tradition that emphasizes the principle of 
autonomy, or by something else?  Similarly, one wonders if the Supreme Court’s movement 
over the last two decades toward greater tolerance of religion in public life is rooted in an 
understanding of the liberal political tradition that stresses the protection of diversity over 
the promotion of autonomy. 
The aim of this study is to examine the Supreme Court’s establishment clause 
jurisprudence against the backdrop of Galston’s writings to see if we can discern in the 
Court’s treatment of religion any affinities with the two concepts of liberalism Galston 
describes.  To this end, I explore the cases in which the Court has wrestled with the 
degree to which public funds can be used to support the education of children enrolled in 
religious schools and the cases in which it has used the establishment clause to remove all 
official religious practices and symbols from public schooling.  I focus on the issue of 
religion and schooling because this is where the Court’s modern establishment clause 
jurisprudence began and, because it is the context in which a sizeable majority of 
establishment clause cases have been decided, it is the milieu in which the Court’s 
establishment clause jurisprudence has largely been fashioned.  As Galston points out, 
moreover, the issue of education is one in which the conflict between autonomy and 
diversity is especially pronounced.  To anticipate my conclusions, I suggest that there are 
affinities between autonomy-centered liberalism and the jurisprudence that seeks to 
secularize the public sphere, on the one hand, and between diversity-centered liberalism 
and the jurisprudence that seeks not to privatize religion but to ensure only that 
government does not directly support religion, on the other hand.  The similarities in both 
cases are not so strong or robust, however, as to indicate a straightforward connection 
between liberal political philosophy and the Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence.  
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The political theorist William Galston argues that the liberal political tradition 
contains two conflicting strands of philosophical thought1  One emphasizes the principle 
of autonomy, while the other stresses the principle of diversity.  These principles, Galston 
argues, are in tension with each other and as guiding criterions lead to quite different 
public policies.  Autonomy-centered liberalism seeks to promote autonomy or “individual 
self-direction”; it reflects a “commitment to sustained rational examination of self, others, 
and social practices.”2 As such, autonomy-centered liberals are generally suspicious of 
religious belief and seek to confine it to the private sphere.  Diversity-centered liberalism, 
on the other hand, seeks to maximize the public space (legally, institutionally, and 
culturally) in which different individuals and groups can live out their differences, limited 
only by the demands of liberal social unity.  Many cultural/political disputes today, 
Galston contends, can be understood as a conflict between the principles of autonomy 
and diversity.  
Although Galston does not focus on constitutional law, his explanation of the 
different conceptions of the liberal political tradition and the place of religion in it raises 
the question of the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court’s establishment clause 
jurisprudence can be explained by the autonomy-diversity dichotomy he has drawn.  That 
is, just as autonomy-centered liberalism seeks to confine religion to the private sphere, so 
too has much of the Supreme Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence.3 The question 
arises then as to whether the Supreme Court’s effort to limit the public role of religion 
1
 William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism 15-27 (2002).  See also Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 
Ethics 105: 516-534 (1995). 
2
 Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 21.
3 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), where Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in a 
ruling declaring unconstitutional New Jersey and Pennsylvania laws supplementing the salaries of teachers 
teaching secular subjects in parochial schools, declared that the “[c]onstitution decrees that religion must be 
a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice.”  I examine the 
privatization thesis at length in Kevin Pybas, Does the Establishment Clause Require Religion to be 
Confined to the Private Sphere?, Valparaiso University Law Review (forthcoming, Fall 2005).  
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has been driven by an understanding of the liberal political tradition that emphasizes the 
principle of autonomy, or by something else?  Similarly, one wonders if the Supreme 
Court’s movement over the last two decades toward greater tolerance of religion in public 
life4 is rooted in an understanding of the liberal political tradition that stresses the 
protection of diversity over the promotion of autonomy. Our curiosity about the 
possibility that much of the Supreme Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence is itself 
a debate about the meaning of the liberal political tradition—whether, per Galston, it is 
best understood as autonomy-centered or diversity-centered—is heightened when we 
observe that the plain language of the establishment clause and the history of the First 
Amendment provide few, if any, clear-cut answers to contemporary questions of religion-
state relations.  Noting this, Justice Byron White once remarked that  
In the end, the courts have fashioned answers to these questions as best 
they can, the language of the Constitution and its history having left them 
a wide range of choices among many alternatives.  But decision has been 
unavoidable; and, in choosing, the courts necessarily have carved out what 
they deemed to be the most desirable national policy governing various 
aspects of church-state relationships.5
4 See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (allowing a state-employed sign-
language interpreter to assist a deaf student enrolled in a Roman Catholic high school); Rosenberger v. 
Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding that a public university does 
not violate the establishment clause when it makes student activity funds available to various student 
groups, including a student-run religious organization, on the basis of  neutral criteria); Agostini v. Felton, 
521 U.S. 203 (1997) (allowing state-employed teachers to offer instruction in remedial and enrichment 
courses in parochial schools) (overruling Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), and 
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding a federal law 
providing instructional materials such as library books, media materials, and computers to religious 
schools) (overruling parts of Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), and Wolman v. Walter, 433  U. S. 
229 (1977)); and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding an Ohio law providing 
tuition assistance to students enrolled in religious schools).  See also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) 
(upholding the constitutionality of a Minnesota law allowing parents to take a tax deduction for school 
expenses, irrespective of whether their children attended public or private schools, including parochial 
schools); and Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (finding no 
constitutional violation in allowing a college student to use neutrally available state vocational 
rehabilitation assistance funds at a Christian college).
5 Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J., 
dissenting).  
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If neither the language of the First Amendment nor the history of its ratification makes 
necessary the specific conclusions the Supreme Court has reached in its many 
establishment clause decisions, what accounts for the ways in which the Court has 
resolved these cases?  Perhaps it is the case that Supreme Court’s articulation of what it 
has “deemed to be the most desirable national policy governing” religion in public life is 
driven by broader moral and philosophical considerations, that is, by its understanding of 
the liberal political tradition and the place of religion in it. Examining the Court’s 
establishment clause cases in light of the philosophical dichotomy drawn by Galston may 
thus illuminate this area of the law in a way that scholarship emphasizing either historical 
arguments about the meaning of the First Amendment or doctrinal developments does 
not.  
The aim of this study then is to examine the Supreme Court’s establishment 
clause jurisprudence against the backdrop of Galston’s writings to see if we can discern 
in the Court’s treatment of religion any affinities with the two concepts of liberalism 
Galston describes.  I shall proceed, first, in Part I, by more fully examining Galston’s 
writings.  I shall then explore in Part II the cases in which the Court has wrestled with the 
degree to which public funds can be used to support the education of children enrolled in 
religious schools and the cases in which it has used the establishment clause to remove all 
official religious practices and symbols from public schooling.  I focus on the issue of 
religion and schooling because this is where the Court’s modern establishment clause 
jurisprudence began6 and, because it is the context in which a sizeable majority of 
establishment clause cases have been decided, it is the milieu in which the Court’s 
establishment clause jurisprudence has largely been fashioned.  As Galston points out, 
6 See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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moreover, the issue of education is one in which the conflict between autonomy and 
diversity is especially pronounced.  Part III attempts to link the competing interpretations 
of the liberal political tradition with competing interpretations of the establishment clause 
as they are reflected in the religion and schooling cases.  I state my conclusions in Part IV 
of the paper.  To anticipate my conclusions, I suggest that there are affinities between 
autonomy-centered liberalism and the jurisprudence that seeks to secularize the public 
sphere, on the one hand, and between diversity-centered liberalism and the jurisprudence 
that seeks not to privatize religion but to ensure only that government does not directly 
support religion, on the other hand.  The similarities in both cases are not so strong or 
robust, however, as to indicate a straightforward connection between liberal political 
philosophy and the Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence.  
Before proceeding, I wish to note that in examining the cases my aim is not to 
give an exhaustive account of the justices’ arguments and counterarguments or to argue 
that one side or the other gets it right (or wrong) in their treatment of precedent and 
constitutional history.  Rather my focus is on those aspects of the respective opinions that 
are helpful in understanding and illustrating the different philosophical assumptions—the 
different understandings of liberalism—that seem to underlie them.  I must note, too, that 
a striking feature of much of the Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence is the 
absence of any meaningful moral or philosophical reflection about the place of religion in 
a free society.  In seeking to comprehend the Court’s understanding of liberalism in these 
cases, then, one must attempt to draw out from cursory historical analyses and generally 
conclusory statements about the meaning of the establishment clause the moral and 
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philosophical assumptions on which the decisions seem to rest.  Finally, my attitude, if 
you will, in this paper is speculative and suggestive rather than certain and conclusory.   
I.  Galston on Two Concepts of Liberalism
According to Galston, within the broad liberal political tradition the principles of 
autonomy and diversity are in tension with each other.  By autonomy, Galston means 
“individual self-direction in at least one of many senses explored by John Locke, 
Immanual Kant, John Stuart Mill, and Americans writing in an Emersonian vein.  Liberal 
autonomy is frequently linked with the commitment to sustained rational examination of 
self, others, and social practices."7  Diversity, on the other hand, is defined as "legitimate 
differences among individuals and groups over such matters as the nature of the good 
life, sources of moral authority, reason versus faith, and the like."8  In Galston's view, 
many liberals, past and present, mistakenly assume that diversity and autonomy "fit 
together and complement one another: The exercise of autonomy yields diversity, while 
the fact of diversity protects and nourishes autonomy."9 In practice, however, the 
principles rarely harmonize: "[I]n currently disputed areas such as education, rights of 
association, and the free exercise of religion  . . . they point in quite different 
7
 Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 21. 
8 Id.  While Galston defines diversity as "differences among individuals and groups," his primary concern, 
as will become clear below, is with group diversity.  If Galston were to understand diversity primarily in 
terms of cultivating individual difference, he would be drawn more than he intends in the direction of 
autonomy, but in fact he is a critic of autonomy as an ideal.  We should note also that when Galston uses 
the words "individual" or "individualism," he does not attach to them the Millian notion of self-
development or the Kantian idea self-perfection, and he does not use the term pejoratively, in the manner of 
Tocqueville.  Instead, individualism "corresponds [with] the liberal virtue of independence—the disposition 
to care for, and take responsibility for, oneself and to avoid becoming needlessly dependent on others." 
William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State 222 (1991).
9
 Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 21.
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directions."10 Disputes in education and with regard to religion as well as in other areas 
are thus best understood "as a conflict between these two principles."  Many cultural and 
political conflicts derive from "the decision to throw state power behind the promotion of 
individual autonomy," and this "can undermine individuals and groups that do not and 
cannot organize their affairs in accordance with that principle without undermining the 
deepest sources of their identity."11  The promotion of autonomy, moreover, often leads 
liberal societies to act "in ways that reduce diversity."12
Liberal societies need not promote autonomy, however, to retain their liberal 
character.  Indeed, 
properly understood, liberalism is about the protection of legitimate diversity.  
A liberal state need not and should not take sides on such issues as purity 
versus mixture [of cultures] or reason versus tradition.  To place an ideal of 
autonomous choice . . . at the core of liberalism is in fact to narrow the range 
of possibilities available within liberal societies.  In the guise of protecting 
the capacity for diversity, the autonomy principle in fact represents a kind of 
uniformity that exerts pressure on ways of life that do not embrace 
autonomy. . . .  '[T]he Kantian and Millian conceptions of liberalism (which 
rest on autonomy and individuality as specifications of the good life) are not 
adequate solutions to the political problems of reasonable disagreements 
about the good life.  They have themselves simply become another part of the 
problem.'13
The unspoken premise here, I believe, is that diversity arises out of different communities 
and is not reducible to individual differences.  In contrast to Mill’s critique of custom and 
tradition and the power they hold over individual choice, to say nothing of his argument that 
individuals are not truly free unless they have freely chosen their way of life, Galston 
suggests that individuality makes sense only in the context of community.  Before 
10
 Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 21.      
11
 Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 21.
12
 Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, supra note 1, at 522.
13
 Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 23 (quoting Charles Larmore, Political Liberalism, Political 
Theory 18: 345 (1990)).
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individuals are adults capable of choosing a way of life for themselves, they are children in 
need of nurturing and development.  Done well, rearing children requires vibrant, supportive 
communities, including "families, neighborhoods, schools, voluntary associations, and 
religious institutions."14 Public policies promoting self-development or self-perfection 
undermine diversity by making more difficult the existence of subcommunities not 
organized around those principles.  The push to make individuality or autonomy the 
organizing principle of all of society thus undermines in the long run the conditions that 
prepare children to make meaningful choices as adults.        
Galston maintains that while the conflict between autonomy and diversity is
exacerbated by the rise of the modern welfare state, its roots are centuries old.  On the one 
hand, autonomy-centered liberalism is 
linked to an historical impulse often associated with Enlightenment—
namely, liberation through reason from externally imposed authority.  
Within this context, reason is understood as the prime source of authority; 
the examined life is understood as superior to reliance on tradition or faith; 
preference is to be given to self-direction over external determination; and 
appropriate relationships to conceptions of good or of value, and 
especially conceptions that constitute groups, are held to originate only 
through acts of conscious individual reflection on and commitment to such 
conceptions.15
On the other hand, diversity-centered liberalism is connected to what Galston calls the 
"post-Reformation Project—that is, to the effort to deal with the political consequences of 
religious differences in the wake of divisions within Christendom."  The effort to deal with 
the fractionation of Christendom gave rise, in turn, to various political strategies.  The 
strategy that finally carried the day, the one that 
proved most decisive for the development of liberalism, was that of 
accepting and managing diversity through mutual toleration.  Within a 
framework of civic unity, a plurality of religions could be allowed to 
14
 Galston, A Public Philosophy for the 21st Century, The Responsive Community 8 (1998): 18, 21.
15
 Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 24.  By and large, this is what Tocqueville describes as "the 
precepts of Descartes."  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 429-33 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George 
Lawrence trans., HarperPerennial 1966) (1840).  
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coexist.  It was in fact that religious diversity that undergirds, and 
eventually sets in motion the development of, our wider conception of 
individual and cultural difference.  And thus, any reasonable 
understanding of diversity will have to include (though in modern 
circumstances cannot be restricted to) religious commitments.16
The problem then with invoking autonomy as the polestar of public life in a diverse 
society is that doing so places the coercive powers of the state behind a partisan 
conception of the good life; the state “takes sides in the ongoing struggle between reason 
and faith, reflection and tradition.  Autonomy-based arguments are bound to marginalize 
those individuals and groups who cannot conscientiously embrace the Enlightenment 
impulse.”17
Rightly understood, liberalism is concerned with diversity, not autonomy or 
individuality.  This is not to say that autonomy has no place in liberalism.  Galston 
acknowledge that it does, but insists that it is only a feature of liberalism and not the 
whole.  Diversity-centered liberalism provides space for many ways of life, including 
Millian and Kantian ways of life.  But autonomy-centered liberalism, as Galston points
out, leaves little room for diversity, especially as regards ways of life based on faith or 
tradition.  Autonomy advocates, in his view, unnecessarily provoke and marginalize 
many citizens of good will, especially the religious and traditionalists who, for reasons of 
conscience, reject the Enlightenment impulse.  In so doing, autonomy-centered liberalism 
fails to take diversity, understood to encompass our deepest differences, especially our 
religious differences, seriously.  Galston writes: "the state-supported commitment to 
autonomy tugs against specific kinds of lives that differ fundamentally, not just 
16
 Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 25.
17
 Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 25-26.
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superficially, from many others and whose disappearance would reduce social 
diversity."18  Only diversity-centered liberalism "gives diversity its due."
For Galston, diversity-centered liberalism finds practical expression in "the 
'Diversity State'—that is, in public principles, institutions, and practices that afford 
maximum feasible space for the enactment of individual and group differences, 
constrained only by the requirements of liberal social unity."19 Galston’s claim is not that 
the liberal state must be neutral.  There are, he acknowledges, “compelling state interests 
that warrant public interference with group practices.”20  These state interests fall into 
four general categories: “first, solving coordination problems among legitimate activities 
and adjudicating unavoidable conflicts among them; second, deterring and when 
necessary punishing transgressions individuals may commit against one another; third, 
safeguarding the boundaries separating legitimate from illegitimate variations among 
ways of life; and finally, securing the conditions—including the cultural and civic 
conditions—needed to sustain liberal pluralist institutions.”21  The ways in which
18
 Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, supra note 1, at 521.  According to Galston, the failure to take 
diversity seriously is a failing not only of self-professed autonomy liberals, but also of John Rawls, who 
purports, in Political Liberalism, to take as his starting point the fact that people disagree deeply and 
permanently about their moral, philosophic, and religious beliefs.  On Galston's account, Rawls fails to take 
our differences seriously enough, especially as regards religious belief.  Id. at 518-521.  See also Galston, 
Pluralism and Social Unity, Ethics 99: 711-726 (1989) and Liberal Purposes, supra note 8, Chapter 7.
19
 Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, supra note 1, at 524.
20
 Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 23.
21
 Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 125.  Among the civic conditions necessary to sustain the 
Diversity State, or what Galston also calls the liberal pluralist regime, is a tolerant citizenry and a scheme 
of civic education that teaches tolerance along with other liberal virtues.  As regards tolerance, Galston 
expressly rejects the argument made by autonomy liberals that genuine toleration requires intense critical 
reflection on all ways of life, especially as regards inherited beliefs.  The Diversity State must "evince[] a 
strong system of tolerance."  What Galston means here is not a relativistic "wishy-washiness" on moral 
issues, but "the principled refusal to use coercive state instruments to impose one's views on others, and 
therefore a commitment to moral competition through recruitment and persuasion alone."  Id. at 126.  
Moreover, he does not regard unreflective commitment to one's way of life as necessarily inconsistent with 
tolerance.  As he writes, “[c]ivic tolerance of deep differences is perfectly compatible with unswerving 
belief in the correctness of one’s own way of life.”  Galston, Liberal Purposes, supra note 8, at 253.  In 
short, the toleration a liberal polity requires is not skepticism about the correctness of one’s way of life, but 
a commitment not to use state power to impose one's way of life on another.
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individuals and groups may be restricted represent the demands of social unity. Claims 
of unimpeded liberty to live out differences must give way to the public institutions that 
secure the “space within which individuals and groups may lead their lives in accordance 
with their diverse understandings of what gives life meaning and value.”22
The picture Galston draws of the conflict between autonomy-centered liberalism 
and diversity-centered liberalism can be brought into greater relief by examining two 
concrete examples of the conflict.  As Galston argues, the conflict between the principles 
of autonomy and diversity is especially pronounced in the areas of “education, rights of 
association, and the free exercise of religion.”23 Examples of educational disputes that 
Galston notes, which also escalated into free exercise of religion claims, include those 
litigated in Wisconsin v. Yoder24 and Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education.25
The issue in Yoder was whether Old Order Amish fourteen- and fifteen year-old children 
should be exempt, on free exercise grounds, from a compulsory education law requiring 
children to attend school until the age of sixteen.  The Amish parents did not object to 
their children attending school until the age of fourteen but resisted the law on grounds 
that no additional formal education was necessary to prepare their children for 
participation in the Amish way of life and that high school would expose Amish children 
to “worldly influences”26 that threatened to undermine not only the religious beliefs of 
Amish teenagers but the Amish religious community itself. In ruling in favor of the 
Amish, the Court accepted the State of Wisconsin’s claim that the compulsory education 
law was animated by the state’s valid interest in preparing students both for effective 
22
 Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 125.
23
 Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 21.
24
 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
25
 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
26 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.
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participation in the nation’s civic life and for economic self-sufficiency as adults.27  The 
Court concluded, however, that the Amish system of informal, technical post-elementary 
education, with its focus on developing manual labor skills, more than adequately 
prepared Amish children to become productive members of Amish society and even of 
the wider society itself, should they choose to leave the Amish faith.28 As for the civic 
education of the Amish, the Court noted the fact that the Amish had “survived and 
prospered” in this country for over 200 years “as a separate, sharply identifiable and 
highly self-sufficient community[,]” which indicated “that they are capable of fulfilling 
the social and political responsibilities of citizenship” without benefit of a formal high 
school education.29
The issue in Mozert was whether elementary school children had a free exercise 
right to opt out of a reading program that the children’s parents found to be offensive to 
the families’ religious beliefs.  The reading program was intended to build not only 
reading skills but also to teach tolerance by exposing children to diverse viewpoints and 
ways of life so that the students might learn tolerance of others, but some parents 
objected that some of the stories involved denigrated their faith.30 The parents asked not 
that the offending reading program be dropped but only that their children be allowed to 
pursue an alternative reading curriculum.31 Some students were initially provided with 
alternative readings that were satisfactory to the parents.  Ultimately, however, the county 
school board made the objectionable reading series mandatory for all students and 
27 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
28 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222-225.
29 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 225.
30
 Objections to the reading program included claims that it promoted “evolution and ‘secular humanism[,]’ 
. . . ‘futuristic supernaturalism,’ pacifism, magic and false views of death[,]” all in violation of the families’ 
religious beliefs.  Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1062.  
31 Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060.     
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suspended from school those children who refused these readings.32  At this point the 
Mozerts and other families filed suit, claim that the mandatory policy violated their free 
exercise rights. The Court of Appeals denied the families’ free exercise claim, ruling that
the reading program did not compel or coerce the children into violating their religious 
beliefs.  The court reasoned instead that the readers simply exposed the children to ideas, 
ideas that, to be sure, their parents objected to on religious grounds.  But, the court 
concluded, exposure to objectionable ideas does not burden religion in a way against 
which the First Amendment protects.33
These cases are expressions of the conflict between autonomy-centered liberalism 
and diversity-centered liberalism in that the disputes were largely about whether the state 
or public schools should be permitted to develop autonomy or critical reasoning skills in 
the children at issue over the religious objections of their parents.  Galston does not of 
course claim that the legal arguments and the decisions themselves framed the issues in 
such philosophical terms.  Essentially, however, both cases involved state authorities 
promoting a principle—autonomy—that in the abstract is unobjectionable but which in 
each case conflicted with deeply held religious beliefs.  Galston argues that the state’s 
objective in each case—in Yoder to prepare teenagers to become independent, self-
sufficient adults and to participate in the nation’s civic life, and in Mozert to developing a 
tolerant citizenry—could be achieved without infringing upon the religious beliefs of the 
objecting families.  In other words, giving diversity its due means insofar as is feasible 
accommodating the religious beliefs of citizens.  And since the accommodation sought by 
32 Id.
33
 For a compelling account of the Mozert case itself and the larger political struggle of which it was a part, 
see Stephen Bates, Battleground: One Mother’s Crusade, the Religious Right, and the Struggle for Control 
of Our Classrooms (1993).  I question the Mozert ruling in Kevin Pybas, Liberalism and Civic Education: 
Unitary versus Pluralist Alternatives, Perspectives on Political Science 33: 18, 25-26 (2004).
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the religious parents in both cases could have been granted without jeopardizing the 
otherwise legitimate aims of public schooling, Galston thus defends the Yoder decision 
and questions the outcome of Mozert. 34
In summary, autonomy-centered liberalism aims to make autonomy the guiding 
principle of public life.  It is thus often antagonistic toward ways of life that give priority 
to values other than autonomy, such as those based on faith or tradition.  Diversity-
centered liberalism, on the other hand, focuses on pluralism or diversity and seeks to 
maximum the space available for individuals and groups to live according to their own 
best lights, constrained only by the demands of social unity.  Having briefly outlined 
Galston’s arguments, let us now examine various establishment clause/schooling cases to 
see if they might betray any similarities to the moral and philosophical commitments of  
autonomy-centered liberalism or diversity-centered liberalism.
II.  Schooling and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
From the American founding until about the middle of the last century, religion 
was an integral part of the educational experience of the vast majority of children in 
America.  Religion was generally thought to be indispensable to civic or moral 
instruction, and this instruction was regarded as a primary responsibility of the schools.  
This was true even after compulsory public schools began to be established in the mid-
nineteenth century.  For the first hundred years or so of American public schooling, the 
moral component of the curriculum was heavily infused with Protestant Christianity, the 
religion of the majority of the population.35  Protestantism remained dominant, even as 
34
 Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, Chapters 8 and 9.  Also, the arguments of Galston’s Two 
Concepts of Liberalism, supra note 1, are mainly framed around the issues raised in Yoder. 
35 See, e.g., Charles L. Glenn, Jr., The Myth of the Common School (1987).
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the nation was growing more religiously diverse, because of the long-standing practice in 
America of regarding education as properly a matter of local concern.  In most localities, 
the Protestant majority was able to impose its moral ideas on various religious minorities, 
most notably, Roman Catholics, as well as on the irreligious.  Rather than acquiescing in 
moral instruction contrary to their own beliefs, Catholics, after the mid- nineteenth 
century, began to establish parochial schools so that their principles could be passed on to 
their children.
Despite the Protestant character of public schooling, the issue that launched the 
Court’s modern establishment clause jurisprudence was one involving public aid to 
parents of children enrolled in Catholic schools.  In 1947, in Everson v. Board of 
Education of Ewing Township,36 the Supreme Court ruled that the establishment clause of 
the First Amendment was incorporated through the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and thereby made applicable to the states.37  In Everson, the Court, speaking 
through Justice Hugo Black, cited Thomas Jefferson's 1802 letter to the Danbury 
Connecticut Baptist Association for its contention that the First Amendment was intended 
to erect "’a wall of separation between church and state.’"38  The Court interpreted 
Jefferson's metaphor to mean that neither the federal government nor the states "can pass 
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."39
36
 330 U.S. 1.
37
 In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Court indicated that the religion clause of the First 
Amendment is binding on the states, but Cantwell involved only a free-exercise claim.  Left unclear by 
Cantwell was whether the establishment clause was also binding on the states.
38 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.  For perhaps the best account available of Jefferson and his letter to the 
Danbury, Connecticut, Baptist Association, from which the “wall of separation” metaphor is taken, see 
Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation between Church and State (2002).  For 
an argument against the notion that the First Amendment simply restates Jefferson’s (and Madison’s) views 
on church and state, see Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle 
of Religious Freedom (1995).
39 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
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Ironically, after interpreting the establishment clause to mean that “[n]o tax in any 
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,”40
the Court affirmed the constitutionality of a law reimbursing parents for the costs of 
transporting their children to and from Catholic schools.  The reimbursement program, 
the Court concluded, was intended to ensure that children had safe transportation to 
school and back.  As such, it was analogous to the provision of general governmental 
services, such as fire and police protection, and to the maintenance of public highways 
and sidewalks.  The establishment clause does not preclude the state from providing 
ordinary service such as these; therefore, neither does it prohibit legislation providing "a 
general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and 
expeditiously to and from accredited schools."41  The establishment clause "requires the 
state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it 
does not require the state to be their adversary.  State power is no more to be used so as to 
handicap religions than it is to favor them.”42  By interpreting the establishment clause to 
require “a wall of separation between church and state” prohibiting all state aid to 
religion beyond the provision of ordinary governmental services, the Court thus opened 
the door for subsequent challenges to laws providing public funding to religious schools 
and to the Protestant moral instruction that was common in the public schools.    
A.  Public Aid to Religious Schools
Everson set the Court on what has proven to be a meandering course 
distinguishing between constitutional and unconstitutional public assistance to religious 
40 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
41 Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
42 Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
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schools.  The cases include those: affirming a New York state law requiring local school 
districts to lend textbooks without charge to students, including those attending religious 
schools;43 prohibiting governmental support for teachers teaching secular subjects in 
parochial schools;44 striking a New York law providing various forms of public 
assistance to private schools in the state, most of which were religiously affiliated, and to 
parents of children enrolled in private schools;45 allowing the loaning to religious schools 
of secular textbooks purchased with public funds but disallowing the use of instructional 
materials purchased with public money and also prohibiting the provision of auxiliary 
services, such as counseling and speech and hearing therapy;46 forbidding public schools 
from loaning instructional materials to parochial schools and disallowing the use of 
public funds for field trip transportation for parochial school students but allowing the 
use of state-funded standardized tests and scoring services and allowing state-employed 
speech and hearing therapists, counselors, doctors, and nurses to examine parochial 
schools students on school grounds;47 allowing state aid to religious schools to cover the 
costs of state-mandated testing and record keeping;48 upholding the constitutionality of a 
Minnesota law allowing parents to take a tax deduction for school tuition costs, 
irrespective of whether their children attended public or private schools, including 
parochial schools;49 prohibiting the use of state and federal aid to employ public school 
teachers in parochial schools for the teaching of remedial, enrichment, and special 
43 Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
44 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
45 Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 757 (1973).
46 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
47 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229 (1977).
48 Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
49 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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education courses;50 finding no constitutional violation in allowing a college student to 
use neutrally available state vocational rehabilitation assistance funds to study for the 
ministry at a bible college;51 allowing a state-employed sign-language interpreter to assist 
a deaf student enrolled in a Roman Catholic high school;52 finding that a public university 
does not violate the establishment clause when it makes student activity funds available 
to various student groups, including a student-run religious organization, on the basis of  
neutral criteria;53 allowing state-employed teachers to offer instruction in remedial and 
enrichment courses in parochial schools;54 upholding a federal law providing 
instructional materials such as library books, media materials, and computers to religious 
schools;55 and, upholding a state law providing tuition assistance to low-income students
enrolled in religious schools.56
While there is no virtually no philosophical discussion about the liberal political 
tradition and the place of religion in it in any of these cases, one sees in these cases a shift 
in the political principles emphasized, or at least a change in the way the Court 
understands them.  This alteration signals as well, it seems, an adjustment regarding the 
philosophical assumptions upon which the decisions rest.  From Everson until roughly 
the mid-1980s, the Court emphasized the principle of “neutrality” (as between believers 
and non-believers) and the notion that religion is purely a “private matter for the 
50 Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
51 Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
52 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
53 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
54 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), overruling Ball (1985) and Aguilar (1985).
55 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), overruling portions of Meek (1975) and Wolman (1977).
56 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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individual, for the family, and the institutions of private choice.”57  The main test 
employed by the Court for evaluating a law’s neutrality was the so-called Lemon test; that 
is, whether the law has a secular purpose, the primary effect of which is neither to 
promote nor hinder religion, and which does not lead to an “excessive entanglement” of 
religion and the state.58  Because in the religious schooling cases the Court normally 
accepts that the laws at issue have a valid secular purpose, which generally is to assist the 
secular education activities within such schools, the constitutionality of a given law 
generally turned on whether it advanced or inhibited religion or whether it led to an 
excessive entanglement between church and state.  The Court’s understanding of 
neutrality, moreover, was controlled by its commitment to restricting religion to the 
private sphere.  Consequently, it saw no violation of the neutrality principle in a 
compulsory, value-shaping, government-run educational system in which it was, as we 
will see in the next line of cases below, systematically removing all official religious 
aspects from.  The Court’s belief that religion has no proper public dimension thus led it 
to establish a baseline for neutrality that was skewed away from religion from the outset.
In other words, the existence of a secular, governmental school system that all 
taxpayer are required to support makes it hard to understand exactly how the state is 
acting neutrally with regard to religion.  For many parents the ability to transmit their 
religious beliefs to their children is an important feature of liberty, and religious 
schooling is an important means for doing so.  Yet while such families are compelled to 
support the public schools, the Court struck down as a violation of neutrality any effort 
57 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625.  See Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatization of Religion, 41 
Cath. U.L. Rev. 19 (1991).; and Gerard V. Bradley, Dogmatomachy: A “Privatization” Theory of Religion 
Clause Cases, 30 St. Louis U.L.J. 275 (1986). 
58 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
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by the state to aid religious schools that went beyond assistance that could be categorized 
as the provision of basic governmental services.59  Other types of aid were viewed as 
either advancing the religious mission of the school or requiring an excessive 
entanglement of church and state to ensure that the aid was not used for religious 
purposes.  The assumption that religion is a private matter to be confined to the private 
sphere thus blinded a majority of justices in these cases to the decidedly non-neutral 
aspect of public schooling and led them to view most legislative efforts to provide public 
assistance to religious schools as violating the neutrality principle.                      
In cases involving public aid to religious schools the last twenty years, however, 
the Court has moved away from its privatization of religion commitment, which has led 
to a new understanding of neutrality.  In these cases—Mueller, Witters (involving a 
religious college), Zobrest, Agostini, Mitchell, and Zelman—the Court seeks not to 
confine religion to the private sphere but to ensure that the state does not directly promote 
religion.  That the state should not directly promote religion of course was an objective of 
the earlier decisions too, but the privatization commitment of the majority of justices in 
those cases led them to view almost all public assistance to religious schools as a 
violation of the neutrality principle, as they understood it.  The rejection of the 
privatization commitment, on the other hand, has led to a modification of the Lemon test 
and to an understanding of neutrality that does not regard the fact that public assistance 
reaches a religious school as necessarily indicating that the state has aided religion. The 
59
 For example, aid that supplied such things as secular textbooks (E.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 
(1975)) and health and therapeutic services (E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229 (1977)) was permitted 
but instructional materials (E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977 ) and Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 
349 (1975)) and the provision of remedial and enrichment courses (E.g., Grand Rapids School District v. 
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)) were not.
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Lemon test was explicitly modified in Agostini v. Felton.60 A law’s neutrality is now 
judged by whether the challenged legislation has a secular purpose that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion.  Because it is, again, rare in the religious schooling context for a law 
to be struck on the grounds that it lacks a secular purpose, the question of neutrality turns 
mainly on whether a law advances or inhibits religion.  The answer to this question no 
longer depends, however, as it did earlier, on whether the aid secures to the school a basic 
governmental service (previously permissible) or goes beyond this (previously 
impermissible, on the grounds that it either promoted religion or led to an excessive 
entanglement between church and state).  Instead neutrality is now judged by whether the 
challenged legislation is a government program providing benefits to a broad spectrum of 
individuals who are defined without reference to religion and in which government aid 
reaches religious schools only as a result of the independent choices of the recipients.61
60
 521 U.S. 203 (1997).  Specifically, the entanglement portion of Lemon was collapsed into the effects 
portion of the inquiry.  As the Court said of itself and Lemon:
the factors we use to assess whether an entanglement is “excessive” are similar to the 
factors we use to examine “effect.”  That is, to assess entanglement, we have looked to 
“the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that 
the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and religious 
authority.”  Similarly, we have assessed a law’s “effect” by examining the character of 
the institutions benefited (e.g., whether the religious institutions were “predominantly 
religious”) and the nature of the aid that the State provided (e.g., whether it was neutral 
and nonideological).  
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232 (O’Connor, J., citations omitted).
61
 The Court in Zelman appears to have adopted neutrality as the sole constitutional test for judging aid-to-
religion cases.  The four-justice plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), had argued 
that neutrality alone is the appropriate test.  As Justice O’Connor pointed out in her concurring opinion in 
Mitchell, however, the Court had never viewed neutrality as the sole criteria for judging the 
constitutionality of a government-aid program.  Other factors such as the divertibility of the aid to religious 
purposes and whether the aid was for a program that would not otherwise exist but for the aid were also 
important considerations.  Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 838-39 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  See also Justice 
Souter’s Mitchell dissent, 530 U.S. at 878-889.  As Justice Souter points out in his Zelman dissent, Justice 
O’Connor now appears to agree that neutrality is the sole criteria for judging government-aid cases, giving 
the test precedential value that the Mitchell opinion could not.  Zelman, 536 U.S. at 696 n. 6 (Souter, J., 
dissenting).
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As Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Zelman in 2002 in the most recent 
schooling case, stated:
where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and 
provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct 
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own 
genuine and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject 
to challenge under the Establishment Clause62
Under this new understanding of neutrality, a law passes constitutional scrutiny if it 
provides aid on the basis of some non-religious criteria and does not attempt to steer 
recipients toward religion.  For example, the Ohio law at issue in Zelman was found not 
to violate the establishment clause because 1) the eligibility criteria for the voucher 
program was poverty and geography; that is, all financially needy students living within 
the boundaries of the Cleveland school district are eligible to receive tuition assistance; 
and, 2) the money can be used at public schools in adjacent districts and at private 
schools, religious and non-religious, within the Cleveland district.63 The law thus does 
not define recipients on the basis of religion and it provides them with meaningful choice 
as between religious and secular alternatives.  
As is evident, under this newer meaning of neutrality the Court does not object to 
the fact that public assistance promotes the religious mission of a school. On the Court’s 
62 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
63
 It must be noted that the public schools in the adjacent districts refuse to participate in the voucher 
program.  It is a point of contention between the majority and the dissenting justices in Zelman as to 
whether the tuition payments public schools in the adjacent districts would receive for participating in the 
voucher program provides incentives or disincentives for participation.  The majority contends that these 
schools have a financial incentive to participate.  Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653-54.  While the dissenters say that 
it would be a financial burden for them to accept voucher students. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 697-98 (Souter, J., 
dissenting).  This dispute turns on how one counts the public funds available to public schools participating 
in the voucher program.  The Zelman majority argues that all state funds available to the public schools 
have to be considered, including those monies not explicitly part of the voucher program.  The dissenting 
justices argue that only those funds appropriated through the voucher program should be counted in 
determining the program’s incentives and disincentives for school participation.  
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reasoning, such promotion is not attributable to the state, as the private choice of 
individual recipients is the reason public aid gets directed to a religious school.  As the 
majority opinion in Zelman noted, the “incidental advancement of a religious mission, or 
the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributed to the 
individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of 
benefits.”64  On this understanding of neutrality there is no effort to restrict religion to the 
private sphere.  Neutrality requires only that the state neither define recipients of aid on 
the basis of religion nor attempt to steer individuals toward the religious alternative.  That 
some individuals go on to use neutrally available public assistance in a way that promotes 
religion means only that the individuals themselves, not the state, have favored religion.
B.  Religion in the Public Schools
Before Everson the Supreme Court had been largely silent as to the operation of 
the public schools.65 Following Everson the Court used the establishment clause to 
invalidate a variety of state and local educational practices that it judged as promoting 
religion in the public schools.  These practices included "release time" programs whereby 
teachers from all religious groups choosing to participate, and who were paid by the 
groups they represented, were permitted to offer religious instruction in the public 
schools one hour per week;66 state-sponsored nondenominational prayer in which student 
64
 536 U.S. at 652.
65
 Notable exceptions, of course, are Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), holding 
that it was not unconstitutional to expel from school a student who refused to salute the American flag on 
the grounds that it violated the student's religious beliefs.  West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), reversed Gobitis on free speech grounds.
66 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).  Release-time programs where 
religious instruction is offered off campus were held to be constitutional in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 
306 (1952).
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participation was voluntary;67 commencing the school day with Bible reading and 
recitation of the Lord's Prayer;68 a state law prohibiting the teaching of evolutionary 
theory in public schools and universities;69 posting of the Ten Commandments in school 
rooms; 70 commencing the school day with a moment of silence for either meditation or 
voluntary prayer;71 a state law prohibiting the teaching of evolutionary theory in public 
schools and universities unless creation science was also taught;72 clergy-led prayers at 
graduation ceremonies;73 and, student-led prayers at school sporting events.74
Unlike the public assistance cases, one does not find in the public school cases any 
change over time in the Court’s approach to them.  The principle that the state must 
remain neutral with respect to religion is of course the benchmark employed for judging 
the constitutionality of the programs at issue in the various cases.  And the Court 
understands neutrality in the older sense of the term, as in the public aid cases through 
about the mid-1980s, and this understanding has remained constant over the years.  It 
make sense of course that that the understanding has remained unchanged, for the 
context—internal activities of government institutions—does not lend itself to the 
“circuit-breaker” analysis now employed in the aid cases.  That is, religious activities in 
the public schools inescapably involve the state in the promotion of religion.  There is no 
free and independent choice of parents, as is possible in the aid context, to sever the link 
between the state and the promotion of religion.  The rationale that thus runs through 
these cases is that each of the practices at issue lacks a secular purpose and involves the 
67 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
68 Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
69 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.97 (1968).
70 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
71 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
72 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
73 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
74 Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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state, through the public schools, in the promotion of religion in violation of the neutrality 
principle and, hence, the establishment clause.75
Having briefly summarized the Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence in the 
schooling context, let us now examine more closely the reasoning in these cases to see if 
we can discern any particular understanding of the liberal political tradition.
III.  The Understanding of Liberalism in the Schooling Cases 
As I noted earlier, one does not find in any of the church-state cases much of a 
discussion about the meaning of the liberal political tradition and the place of religion in 
it.  What one does find, however, is an intermittent commitment, especially in the Court’s 
establishment clause jurisprudence through the 1960s and 1970s, to the secularization of 
the public sphere.  This is a well-chronicled phenomenon,76 and as George Dent explains
somewhat hyperbolically, is one in which the “Court believed religious people are 
irrational, try to suppress the truth, and need to be enlightened with secular truth”; thus 
“secular justices . . . sought to banish religion from public life and exile it to the private 
75 As I argued earlier, in the schooling context the existence of a public, secular school system skews the 
neutrality baseline away from religion from the beginning.  See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.  
Even so, and without getting into specific cases, the Court’s conclusion that the practices in these cases 
promoted religion seems for the most part generally right.  In other words, I tend to think that most of these 
cases were rightly decided, not because I believe the practices at issue had to be excluded to uphold 
governmental neutrality towards religion, for the establishment of a state-owned, secular school system 
undermines at the outset the claim that the state is acting neutrally concerning religion.  I believe instead 
that respect for diversity requires that the state not promote religion in the public schools.
76 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Believers as Equal Citizens, in Obligations of Citizenship and 
Demands of Faith: Religious Accommodation in Pluralist Democracies 90 (Nancy L. Rosenbaum, ed., 
2001); George W. Dent, Jr., Secularism and the Supreme Court, 1999 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1; and Frederick 
Mark Gedicks, The Rhetoric of Church and State: A Critical Analysis of Religion Clause Jurisprudence 
(1995).   For arguments that the First Amendment requires the establishment of a secular public order, see 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy 195, in The Bill of Rights in the Modern State 
(Geoffrey R. Stone, Richard Epstein, and Cass Sunstein, eds., 1992); and Stephen G. Gey, Why is Religion 
Special? Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion under the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 75 (1990).
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sphere.”77 And Michael McConnell describes “two models of religious citizenship” in 
our public philosophies, including the Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence.78  On the 
one hand, the Court has sought to establish a secular public sphere in which “laws are 
based on secular premises, government programs and activities are strictly secular in 
nature, and religion is deemed to be irrelevant to determination of the citizens’ civil 
obligations[,]” the effect of which is to require “all citizens to put aside their sectarian 
loyalties and convictions in their capacities as citizen, but to allow everyone complete 
freedom to practice religion in private.”79 Yet on the other hand the Court has sometimes 
evinced a commitment to “religious pluralism” that allows “people of all religious 
persuasions to be citizens of the commonwealth with the least possible violence to their 
religious convictions.”80
Having said this, one finds at least hints of the two concepts of liberalism in the 
Court’s religion and schooling establishment clause jurisprudence.  The existence of 
intimations, however, does not establish either that the privatization of religion thesis is 
rooted in autonomy-centered liberalism or that the friendlier view of religion that has 
emerged in the neutral aid cases over the last two decades stems from diversity-centered 
liberalism.  As unreflective philosophically as the Court is, it is possible that both the 
privatization of religion commitment and the more open view of religion derive from 
nothing more rich or comprehensive than either simple skepticism concerning, or support 
for, religion.  The aim of this portion of the essay is thus to see if we might draw out of 
77
 Dent, supra note 76, at 55-56. 
78
 McConnell, supra note 76, at 100-101.
79
 McConnell, supra note 76, at 101.
80
 McConnell, supra note 76, at 100, 103 (quotation is on page 103).
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the religion and schooling cases something more philosophically robust than first meets 
the eye.  
A.  Public Aid to Religious Schools 
The belief that religion is purely a private matter to be confined to the private 
sphere, which was once the majority position on the Court but is no longer so,81 has 
obvious parallels to autonomy-centered liberalism.  According to Galston, autonomy-
centered liberals regard ways of life based on religion or tradition as inferior to a life of 
autonomy or individuality.  One sees a similar negative view towards religion, or at least 
towards religion in the public sphere, in the reasons various justices have given for the 
assertion that the establishment clause requires religion to be restricted to the private 
sphere.  In easily the most extended discussion of the privatization commitment in any 
church-state case, the dissenting justices in Zelman, for example, regard the use of public 
funds in religious schools as tyrannizing the minds of citizens,82 believe that religion 
must be kept private in order to save it from its own corruption,83 and believe that 
religion is hopelessly divisive and threatening to social stability.84
81 See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
82 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting).  See also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 870 (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (“compelling an individual to support religion violates the fundamental principle of freedom 
of conscience”).  Justice Souter’s interpretation of the religion clause is based on his claim, which was 
initially articulated by the Court in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947), that the First 
Amendment enshrines into the constitution the views on religious liberty of Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison as they were articulated in the 1780s in the debate in Virginia over religious freedom.  I collect 
criticisms of this claim at Pybas, Does the Establishment Clause?, supra note 3, at notes 70-71.  I also 
argue that Justice Souter misconstrues Madison’s principles of religious liberty.  Id. at (text accompany 
notes 78-111).    
83 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711-12 (Souter, J., dissenting).  See also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 871 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“government aid corrupts religion”).  
84 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 715 (Souter, J., dissenting); Zelman, 536 U.S. at 717-729 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
See also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 872 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“government establishment of religion (by which 
Justice Souter means any public aid to religion) is inextricably linked with conflict”).
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The belief that religion should be confined to the private sphere purports to be 
true to the original intent of the establishment clause, i.e., it is a claim that the 
establishment clause was intended by the men who drafted and ratified it to bar religion 
from the public sphere to protect rights of conscience, to protect the purity of religion, 
and to protect the public sphere from religiously-motivated civic strife.85 These are not 
inappropriate objects of concern but the claim that the establishment clause was intended 
to restrict religion to the private sphere is patently false. One need only recall that when 
ratified the First Amendment, as with all of the Bill of Rights, limited only Congress in 
its actions, not state governments.  And the states of course provided public support for 
religion in a variety of ways, including established churches, religious tests for office, and
blasphemy laws.86 Whatever the original intent of the establishment clause, it clearly was
not to confine religion to the private sphere as it left unmolested all the ways in which the 
states supported religion.87 Having noted this, I do not wish engage in a debate about the 
original meaning of the establishment clause.  Rather, my aim is to draw out the negative 
view of religion that is suggested or implied in the three rationales of the privatization 
claim.  
85 See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711-13 (Souter, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 870-72 (Souter, J., 
dissenting).
86 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: 
Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 2105 (2003); Leonard W. Levy. The Establishment 
Clause: Religion and the First Amendment, Chapter 2 (1986).
87
 For an argument that the original intent of the establishment clause was largely a jurisdictional statement 
making clear that the new constitution gave Congress no authority to interfere with the states’ authority 
over religion, see Smith, Foreordained Failure, supra note 38.  But cf. Douglas Laycock, Theology 
Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But Missing the 
Liberty, 118 Harvard Law Review 155, 241-43 (2004); ’Nonpreferential’ Aid to Religion: A False Claim 
About Original Intent, 27 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 875, 885-94 (1986) (rejecting federalism interpretation of 
the establishment clause and arguing that it does in fact protect individual rights).
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I have written at length on this previously88 and will not rehearse here the full 
extent of my arguments, though several brief remarks are in order.  First, it is difficult to 
understand how rights of conscience are tyrannized by aid programs of the type that the 
Court has routinely affirmed over the last two decades wherein individual aid recipients 
channel money to schools of their choice, religious or secular.89 In other words, in the 
context of an expansive regulatory state wherein government spends trillions of dollars 
annually90 and intrudes into the lives of citizens in ways unimaginable to the founding 
generation it is hard to see why we should view neutral aid funds that wind up in the 
coffers of religious institutions as a result of the free and independent choices of aid 
recipients as any more offensive to rights of conscience than any other governmental 
spending to which citizens object.  Neutral aid programs coerce no belief or action and 
leave citizens to live according to their own best lights, believing or not believing what 
they will about God, living according to the dictates of their consciences. The claim that 
such programs violate rights of conscience then seems little more than a knee -jerk 
reaction, a mantra duly recited, devoid of any meaningful analysis.  In fact, the easy 
equating of neutral aid programs of today with Patrick Henry’s A Bill Establishing a 
Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion indicates almost a profound lack of 
curiosity about religious liberty.  That is, as I noted above,91 Jefferson and Madison are 
regarded by the privatization justices as authoritative on the meaning of the establishment 
clause, and their writings from which the purported meaning of it is drawn are Jefferson’s 
88
 Pybas, Does the Establishment Clause?, supra note 3.
89 E.g., Mueller, Zobrest, Agostini, Mitchell, and Zelman.
90
 According to the Economic Report of the President 307 (2005) Table B-82 “Federal and state and local 
government current receipts and expenditures, national income and product accounts (NIPA), 1959-2003,” 
the federal government was projected to spend over $2.3 trillion dollars in fiscal year 2004, while state and 
local governments were projected to spend around $1.5 trillion dollars during the same period.  
91 See supra note 82.
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A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom and James Madison’s Memorial and 
Remonstrance against Religious Assessments.92 The Memorial and Remonstrance of 
course was written in opposition to Henry’s Bill, which would have created a property tax
to fund the teaching of Christianity.  The controversy over Henry’s bill, which Madison is 
credited with defeating, gave impetus to the passage into law of Jefferson’s Bill, which 
had been drafted and proposed several years prior to the Henry controversy.93  However 
much Henry’s proposal to explicitly benefit the Christian religion would have violated 
the rights of conscience of citizens of Virginia, which it undoubtedly did, such a proposal 
is miles apart from the neutral aid programs that permit—permit, not require—aid 
recipients to direct their benefits to religious schools.  Jefferson and Madison understood 
their principles of religious liberty as enlarging the sphere of human liberty.  But in the 
context of a far-reaching regulatory state that “touch[es] the lives of its citizens in such 
diverse ways and redirects their financial choices through programs of its own,”94 the 
reflexive cry that religion must be confined to the private sphere in order to protect rights 
of conscience demeans religion as an activity not worthy of serious inquiry.  
Secondly, the claim that religion must be confined to the private sphere in order to 
protect it from its own corruption, that is, to protect it from secularizing influences that 
competition for public dollars inevitably brings, is deeply and unnecessarily paternalistic.  
That religious institutions might relax their principles in order to qualify for public funds 
is a real concern, and were I a member of a religious community contemplating applying 
for public funds, I would be extremely wary of such an undertaking. But I see no reason 
92 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 870-71 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711 (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
93 See Thomas E. Buckley, Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia, 1776-1787 (1977).  
94
 County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 657-
58 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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why the religious themselves should not be permitted to judge for themselves the risks 
and merits of participation in a neutral aid program, and if they are willing to accept the 
terms and conditions of participation, why that decision should not be respected.  What 
evidence exists indicating that the faithful are incapable of safeguarding their faith?  It 
seems to me that the anti-corruption argument is premised on the notion that Supreme 
Court justices care more about the integrity of the faith of religious believers and 
communities than do the faithful themselves—a proposition that seems highly unlikely.
Equally troubling is that the anti-corruption rationale seems also to presuppose that 
Supreme Court justices possess the theological and  constitutional authority to tell the 
faithful how to understand their own faith.  Whatever else we may say about the First 
Amendment, surely it should deny governmental officials any such right.95
As for the third rationale of the privatization claim—that religion must be 
confined to the private sphere in order to protect civic peace and stability—we may 
95 In Does the Establishment Clause?, supra note 3, I argue further that the anti-corruption rationale 
requires the Court to engage in theological evaluations, an undertaking the Court has declared 
unconstitutional in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 
U.S. 440 (1969).  The anti-corruption worry is that the lure of public funds will lead religious entities to be 
unfaithful to their religious principles and identities.  But how is the Court to evaluate when a group has 
been unfaithful to its religious beliefs?  To make such a determination, the Court would have to be well 
versed in theology so that it could decide whether a religious group’s willingness to abide by the terms and 
conditions of participation of an aid program truly amounts to a compromise of belief.  The Court would 
have to make a judgment about whether a religious community’s beliefs remained consistent with 
particular religious doctrines.  Theological judgments, however, are prohibited by Presbyterian Church, 
where the Supreme Court declared that it was unconstitutional for “civil courts to engage in the forbidden 
process of interpreting and weighing church doctrine.”  Id. at 451.  Ownership of local church property was 
at issue in Presbyterian Church, the outcome of which turned on whether certain actions of the national 
denomination “departed substantially” from church doctrine and, if so, whether the departure was 
significant or not.  In other words, the dispute required the judiciary “to determine matters at the very core 
of religion—the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the 
religion. “ Id., at 450.  “Plainly,” the Court declared, “the First Amendment forbids civil courts from 
playing such a role.”  Id.  It seems to me that in seeking to be the guardian of religious belief, the Court has 
to engage in something like what Presbyterian Church forbids.  To relegate religion to the private sphere in 
order to prevent its corruption is to worry that the religious will depart from their principles and beliefs if 
permitted to participate in neutral aid programs.  But to worry about a loosening of beliefs and principles 
involves the Court in second-guessing the understanding believers have of their faith, which Presbyterian 
Church forbids.    
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reasonably wonder just how socially and politically disruptive religion’s involvement in 
the public sphere is.  Those justices who argue that establishment clause requires religion 
to be confined to the private sphere expend great energy worrying about the divisive 
potential of religion while failing to notice religion’s long involvement in the public 
sphere in this country, a connection that has produced no lasting social strife.  In her 
concurring opinion in Zelman, for example, Justice O’Connor points out that many 
billions of public dollars annually wind up in the coffers of religious institutions through 
state and federal tax policies, public health programs, childcare programs, and student 
loan and subsidy programs.96  Most of the programs Justice O’Connor notes came into 
existence during the New Deal and afterwards, yet one is hard-pressed to point to any 
enduring religiously-motivated social disruptions caused by the participation of religion 
in these various programs.  This of course is not meant to deny that much evil has taken 
place in name of religion throughout human history, including American history.97  I do 
mean to question, however, how instructive such atrocities are for evaluating the divisive 
potential of neutral aid programs.  It seems to me that the real issue concerning the 
participation of religious entities in neutral aid programs has been fundamentally 
misunderstood by those justices who seek and have sought to confine religion to the 
private sphere.  Take Justice Souter, for example, who would deny religious schools the 
right to participate in aid programs of the type at issue in Mitchell and Zelman because, 
among other reasons, of the concern about religiously motivated political strife.  The 
96 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 665-668 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor uses the information cited to 
make a different point that I am making, namely, that the amount of public funds going to religious schools 
participating in the voucher program at issue in Zelman paled in comparison to the amount of public dollar 
already constitutionally permitted to flow to religious institutions.    
97 See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 191-478 (2002) (recounting fierce anti-
Catholicism surrounding schooling and other public policy debates from the mid nineteenth century into 
the twentieth century); and John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment 
Clause, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279, 297-318 (2001) (same focusing largely on the issue of schooling).
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problem with this view is that the debate over the inclusion of religious institutions in 
such program is not a religious debate; it is a political one.  The debate is not about 
religion or establishing religious truth or government taking sides in a religious debate.  
Instead, it is a debate about political principles as regards the structure and financing of 
the education of children in a free society.98 Only political values are implicated in the 
debate over public aid to religious schools.  It is a political debate carried on by ordinary 
political means.  The establishment of religious truth or religious orthodoxy is not part of 
the debate.  What is sought is not the establishment of religious orthodoxy but an end to 
the government’s monopolization of education funds.  As Gerard Bradley argues, the 
issue of public aid to religious schools “has never been agitated in a way distinguishable 
from political conflict generally, and the Court has done nothing except assert, without a 
scintilla of evidence, the contrary.”99 This of course does not deny that religion is in the 
background of the debate, but in a religious society such as ours religion is in the 
background of virtually every political issue.  And yet does not the American experience 
confirm that individuals and groups of different religions and of no religion are capable 
of living together more or less peacefully?  
One should not misconstrue me as advocating any particular boundary between 
religion and the state, or of encouraging an uncritical, unqualified, or unlimited 
involvement of religion in the public square, or as denying the possibility that religion
could come to jeopardize civic stability. As I noted above, human history, including 
American history, to say nothing of the current decade, undeniably teaches otherwise.
98 See, e.g., Pybas, Liberalism and Civic Education, supra note 33; Stephen Macedo, Diversity and 
Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy (2000); Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education 
(1987).   
99
 Gerard V. Bradley, Dogmatomachy: A “Privatization” Theory of Religion Clause Cases, 30 St. Louis 
U.L.J. 275, 304 (1986).
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My point rather is to note that in the American context religion has always had some 
involvement in the public sphere and yet on the whole our experience has been one 
without enduring religious conflict.  And this is especially true post-New Deal where, as I 
noted above,100 billions of dollars have been routed through religious institutions without 
generating worrisome social strife.  Despite the fretfulness expressed by Justice Souter 
and others who seek to confine religion to the private sphere, it is telling that they fail to 
cite any examples of lasting religious conflict in this country beyond referencing the 
divisiveness of the founding era state-supported churches and 17th century Europe.101  We 
should note, too, that Justice Stevens cites religious conflict in “the Balkans, Northern 
Ireland, and the Middle East” as evidence as to why religion must be confined to the 
private sphere in this country.102 In other words, I take my point that America has been 
largely free of enduring religiously-motivated political strife, especially as regards neutral 
aid programs, to be conceded by the privatization justices’ failure to point to any 
meaningful examples of it.
The belief that religion must be confined to the private sphere does not 
necessarily indicate hostility to religion, though in the past some justices’ privatization 
commitments were infused with views that bordered  on, if not crossed the line into, anti-
Catholicism.103  It does suggest, however, that the privatization commitment prevents 
100 See supra text accompanying note 92.
101 See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947); and Zelman, 536 U.S. at 718 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).   
102 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103
 See Justices Black and Douglas’ dissenting opinions is Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 
(1968) and Douglas’ concurring opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  In Lemon, for 
example, Justice Douglas approvingly quotes an anti-Catholic tract claiming that in 
the parochial schools Roman Catholic indoctrination is included in every subject.  
History, Literature, geography, civics, and science are given a Roman Catholic slant.  The 
whole education of the child is filled with propaganda.  That, of course, is the very 
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individuals who adhere to it from thinking about religion in the public sphere in any but 
negative terms.  That is, while the reasons given in support of the claim that the 
establishment clause requires religion to be confined to the private sphere—to protect 
rights of conscience, to safeguard religion from its own corruption, and to protect the 
civic peace—are not inappropriate objects of concern, they are explored in such a 
shallow, dogmatic way by the justices committed to the privatization of religion that this 
conclusion seems foreordained from the outset, as an a priori negative judgment about 
religion, rather than as the result of a careful, searching inquiry into how religious liberty 
can be protected and promoted in the modern administrative state.
Another similarity between the privatization of religion jurisprudence and 
autonomy-centered liberalism is that both give insufficient attention to the nation’s 
religious diversity.  Recall that Galston argues that autonomy- centered liberalism fails to 
take diversity seriously,104 and that public policies promoting autonomy are harmful to 
“individuals and groups who cannot conscientiously embrace the Enlightenment 
impulse.”105  Hints of this same failure to seriously reflect upon the nation’s rich religious 
diversity are present in the claim that the establishment clause requires religion to be 
confined to the private sphere.  Despite the nation’s religious diversity, the privatization 
thesis insists that the only education worthy of public support is secular education.  The 
privatization of religion thus fails to take diversity seriously in two respects.  First, as 
purpose of such schools, the very reason for going to all the work and expense of 
maintaining a dual school system.  Their purpose is not so much to educate, but to 
indoctrinate and train, not to teach Scripture truths and Americanism, but to make loyal 
Roman Catholics.  The children are regimented, and are told what to wear, what to do, 
and what to think. 
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 635 n. 20 (Douglas, J., concurring).
104 See supra text accompanying notes 17-18. 
105
 Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 25-26.
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between religion and secularism, it places the state on the side of secularism.  What is 
more, it discriminates against families who desire a religiously-oriented education for 
their children by taxing them for education purposes but denying them any share of the 
proceeds.  Families who desire a religious education are thus compelled to pay for the 
education of other children while at the same time paying twice, as it were, for a religious 
education.  
A critic might object that attention to diversity is precisely what motivates the 
privatization of religion stance.  That is, one might argue that the justices who hold to the 
privatization view do so out of concern that to do otherwise would be to put the state’s 
imprimatur of approval upon mainly one religion—Christianity—the religion of the 
overwhelming majority of religious schools in America.106  The privatization of religion, 
one might therefore argue, is an expression of respect for our nation’s religious diversity 
in that no one religion receives favored treatment.  In other words, the privatization of 
religion treats all religions equally; it insists that none can receive public assistance.  On 
its face this is not an implausible argument.  However, I am unaware of any justice 
making this argument in a public assistance case.  If this is the actual motivating force 
behind the privatization view, moreover, what is one to make of the negative assessment 
106
 The National Center for Education Statistics reports, for example, that there were approximately 29,000 
private schools in existence during the 2001-02 school year, and 22,595 of these had a religious orientation.  
Because of the existence of an “other” category, it is not possible to state with exact precision the precise 
religious orientation of the religious schools.  However, it appears that of the 22,595 privates religious 
schools, 188 were Islamic, 730 Jewish, and 602 other.  Assuming that none of the schools in the “other” 
category were Christian, there were 1,520 non-Christian (Islamic, Jewish, and other) religious schools and 
21,075 Christian schools during 2001-02.  The Christian schools represent more than twenty different 
Christian theological outlooks.  During the same year, about 4.4 million students (out of approximately 5.3 
million children attending private schools) attended religious schools.  Islamic schools enrolled about 
23,000 students, Jewish schools about 199,000 students, and “other” schools about 57,000 students.  
Approximately 4.1 million students thus attended Christian schools of one type or another.  See Tables 6 
and 7, Characteristics of Private Schools in the United States: Results from the 2001-2002 Private School 
Universe Survey, available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/2005305.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2005). 
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of religion that generally accompanies the privatization commitment?107  Were respect 
for religious diversity the motivation for the privatization of religion, surely that could be 
articulated without the off-putting critique of religion that runs through the privatization 
opinions.         
Whereas a minority of justices continues to insist that religion be confined to the 
private realm, the majority view that has emerged over the last two decades aims not to 
limit religion but to ensure simply that the state does not directly promote religion.108
This position is obviously friendlier to religion than is the privatization stance.  But these 
opinions are no more philosophically reflective than are the privatization opinions.  Still, 
one sees in them a hint of a philosophical understanding that is akin to Galston’s 
diversity-centered liberalism.  
Specifically, it is the shift the majority effects with regard to the meaning of 
neutrality that points to an understanding of liberalism that is more diversity oriented.  
The Zelman decision makes clear, for example, that a law is neutral, and therefore 
constitutional, as long as it neither defines aid recipients on the basis of religion nor 
attempts to channel them toward religious alternatives.  This is so even if a great majority 
of beneficiaries actually choose the religious option.  As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in 
Zelman, “[t]he constitutionality of a neutral education aid program simply does not turn 
on whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are run 
by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious 
school.”109 On this view, religious schooling is an unexceptional alternative in a 
pluralistic society; the choice for religious schooling is no more noteworthy than the
107 See supra text accompanying notes 81-103
108 See supra text accompanying notes 57-64.
109 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 658.
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choice for secular education.  The justices holding this position are unmoved by the fact 
that in a neutrally available program some or even many families will choose the 
religious alternative.  They seek neither to confine religion nor marginalize religious 
belief, only to ensure that the state does not directly promote religion.  From this 
perspective, the Court’s proper oversight of religion is simply to ensure that public policy 
does not favor religion, that it does not define recipients on the basis of religion or 
attempt to channel them toward the religious alternative.
This comports with diversity-centered liberalism in the sense that it recognizes the 
religiously diverse character of the United States and leaves families free to choose the 
religious alternative or not, according to the dictates of their own beliefs.  It recognizes, 
too, that religious believers are citizens and taxpayers who have contributed to the 
government’s education fund.  Consequently, the diversity approach, if it may be called 
that, does not regard the fact that public funds are used in religious schools as an instance 
of the state favoring religion.  Instead, it treats such programs as allowing the families of 
religious school students simply to share in the pool of resources that they helped 
establish.  Public funding of religious schools serves the interest of diversity by 
expanding the educational opportunities available to a diverse population.  There is then 
for these justices no meaningful objection to including religious schools in the publicly 
funded alternatives parents and children have so long as religion is not favored.    
The majority’s insistence that religion not be favored further suggests an 
understanding of liberalism analogous to diversity- centered liberalism.  Were a public 
program to favor religion, it would fail to take diversity seriously in that it would fail to 
acknowledge that many Americans do not profess any religious beliefs at all, or they 
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profess religious beliefs different from those found in many religious schools.  In other 
words, the majority seems to recognize that while any reasonable conception of diversity 
has to include religion, it cannot be limited to religion.
B.  Religion in the Public Schools 
The understanding of liberalism that seems to underlie the judgments in the public 
school cases is less clear than it is in the public aid cases.  One reason for this, I think, is 
that unlike the jurisprudence in the aid cases, there has been no shift in the understanding 
of neutrality in the public school cases.  That is, in these cases the Court has been 
consistent in insisting that religion be restricted to the private sphere.  As Justice 
Kennedy wrote for the Court in Lee v. Weisman, declaring unconstitutional clergy-led 
graduation ceremony prayers, “[t]he design of the Constitution is that preservation and 
transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed 
to the private sphere.”110 That the jurisprudence of the public school cases has not 
followed that of the aid cases is not surprising.  For the context—the activities of the 
public schools—of necessity does not allow for a reconceptualization of neutrality, at 
least not along the lines of the public aid cases.  Public schooling is not a neutrally 
available public assistance program that leaves it to families to choose between secular 
and religious alternatives.  There is no intervening independent choice of families, as in 
the public aid cases, that breaks the circuit, as it were, between the state and religion.111
Religious activities in the public schools inescapably involve the state in the promotion of 
religion.  Consequently, in this context the only alternative to the state’s promotion of 
110 Lee, 505 U.S. at 589.
111 See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.  
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religion is to insist that religion be limited to the private sphere.112  Perhaps the starkness 
of alternatives in this context helps explain why in this line of cases one sees nothing of 
the negative view of religion in the Court’s opinions as is found in the public aid cases.
That is, the simplicity of the choice before the Court in the public schooling cases—either 
permit the state to promote religion or not—leads the Court to engage in little analysis 
beyond stating the purported historical meaning of the establishment clause.  In short, the 
fact that the Court generally does not view the public school cases as difficult decisions
leads it to say little at all about religion.  This contrasts with the aid cases, where in the 
context of the modern regulatory state one might view the programs at issue as rather 
unremarkable.  This was of course Justice O’Connor’s point in her concurring opinion in 
Zelman,113 where she cataloged the variety of ways that religion and the state mix in the 
modern bureaucratic state, all without violating the establishment clause.114  In other 
words, in the age of trillion dollar government budgets,115 the fact that a few education 
spending program permit families to choose religious alternatives is not particularly 
momentous, especially in light of the fact that to the extent that public monies end up in 
religious institutions it is because of recipient choice rather than governmental direction.
Because neutral aid programs permitting religious choice are rather unexceptional 
features of our administrative state, those justices who wish to restrict religion to the 
private sphere are compelled to argue not simply that neutral aid programs are 
112
 In this regard, note that Justices Kennedy and O’Connor adhere to the privatization thesis in the public 
school cases but not the aid cases.  See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) and Sante Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), where they were part of the Court majority 
declaring unconstitutional public school graduation ceremony prayers and athletic event prayers, 
respectively.  But they reject the privatization thesis in the aid cases.  See, e.g, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 
536 U.S. 639 (2002), where they were part of the five-justice majority approving of the inclusion of 
religious schools in a publicly-funded voucher program. 
113 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 665-668 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
114 See supra text accompanying note 96.
115 See supra note 90.  
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unconstitutional, but also that they are unwise policies—that religion threatens the rights 
of others and is it itself endangered by the secular state when it seeks to move beyond the 
private sphere.  In the aid cases the privatization justices thus articulate lengthy, 
substantive-like critiques of religion—policy judgments cloaked in legal arguments—
while saying nothing of substance about religion in the public school cases.  
We might look to the dissenting opinions in the public school cases for some hint 
as to the understanding of liberalism that informs the Court’s decisions in this line of 
cases.  Unfortunately, however, the opinions of the dissenting justices in these cases are 
unhelpful in trying to draw out the philosophical assumptions of either the position for 
excluding or for permitting official religions activities in the public schools.  These 
justices—among the current Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, who would allow, for example, official prayers at graduation ceremonies and at 
school sporting events—generally rest their arguments on history rather than any implicit 
philosophical arguments.116
Further clouding the issue of just what understanding of liberalism animates the 
public school cases is the fact that the cases excluding religion from the public schools 
can be justified on the basis of diversity-centered liberalism, or at least a version of it.  
That is, the state fails to take diversity seriously, to respect the beliefs of all citizens, 
religious and nonreligious alike, when it places its weight behind one (usually) religion—
namely, Christianity.  Respect for religious diversity, then, requires the state to abstain 
from inculcating religious beliefs, even through the relatively mild measures that have 
been declared unconstitutional.  While the exclusion of religion from the public schools 
116 See, e.g., Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), and Chief Justice 
(then Associate Justice) Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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can be justified by a thin account of the diversity principle, none of the public school 
cases appear to rest on this rationale.  To be sure, there is the occasional mention of 
diversity, as in Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Abington School District v. 
Schempp, where he notes how much more religiously diverse the nation is now than at its 
founding.117 Instead the main rationale for these cases is simply that the establishment 
clause forbids the government’s involvement in religious activities.  In any event, 
attempting to justify the decisions on the basis of any robust notion of diversity would be 
problematic in light of the compulsory, secular nature of the public schools.           
Leaving aside the important question of whether public schooling itself rests upon 
an understanding of liberalism that is autonomy-centered,118 to the extent that one sees 
any notion of the Court’s understanding of liberalism in the public school cases, it is in its 
claims about the purportedly different functions of public schooling and private schooling 
and the dissimilar principles that are said to animate each.  Justice Brennan states this 
view well in his concurring opinion in Abington School District v. Schempp, where he 
writes that “public schools serve a uniquely public function: the training of American 
citizens in a atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of any sort—
an atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heritage common to all American 
groups and religions.”119 The Schempp decision prohibits public schools from beginning 
117 Abington School District, 374 U.S. at 240 (Brennan, J., concurring).
118
 Charles Glenn, for example, traces the origin of the common school movement to eighteenth century 
France, where it emerged as part of the Enlightenment agenda.  The cultural elite of late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century France advocated state-controlled schools as a means by which children could be 
educated toward Enlightenment values and away from religion or, as the elite saw it, away from 
“superstition.”  Glenn argues further that Horace Mann and other leaders of the common school movement 
in America in the mid-nineteenth century regarded state-controlled schools primarily as a means by which 
Enlightenment values could be inculcated in rising generations of children.  Simply stated, fashioning 
loyalties and a shared national identity were as important, if not more so, to Mann and his followers as 
teaching basic academic skills.  Charles L. Glenn, Jr., The Myth of the Common School (1987).
119 Abington School District, 374 U.S. at 241-42 (Brennan, J. concurring) (emphasis in original).
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school days with Bible reading and a recitation of the Lord's Prayer, and Justice
Brennan’s point, in the quotation above, is that official religious exercises introduce 
divisiveness into the schools that would otherwise be absent.  This is not the place for a 
comprehensive critique of Justice’s Brennan’s claim, but his insinuation that but for 
religion public schooling would be free of “divisive influences” is not one that accords 
with the history of public schooling.  Stephen Arons, for example, in criticizing 
government-run schooling, documents a wide array of contemporary disputes over the 
moral and civic instruction in the public schools.120 Let us not forget too that the public 
schools are a critical staging ground for what James Davison Hunter and others have 
referred to as “culture wars.”121 Witness the ever more common conflicts over sex 
education and multicultural and diversity education in the public schools.122 To be sure, 
in a nation as religiously and morally diverse as ours, official religious exercises in the 
public schools are indeed divisive, but it is not the case that the removal of such practices 
has ended our divisions over public schooling.
Justice Brennan’s larger point, however, is that public schools are animated by 
“democratic values” and “serve a uniquely public function”123 while “sectarian education 
. . . offers values of its own.”124  That public function, of course, is to turn children from 
diverse backgrounds into democratic or liberal citizens, or as Justice Brennan puts it, to 
be the instrument of assimilation for “all American groups and religions.”125 Or as 
Justice Brennan wrote for the Court elsewhere, “[p]ublic schools are “vitally important 
120
 Stephen Arons, Short Route to Chaos: Conscience, Community, and the Re-Constitution of American 
Schooling (1997), and Compelling Belief: The Culture of American Schooling (1983). 
121
 James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (1991).
122 See, e.g., Michael Janofsky, Gay Rights Battlefields Spread to Public Schools,  New York Times, June 
9, 2005, at A18.
123 Abington School District, 374 U.S. at 241-42 (Brennan, J. concurring) (emphasis in original).
124 Abington School District, 374 U.S. at 242 (Brennan, J. concurring).
125 Abington School District, 374 U.S. at 242 (Brennan, J. concurring).  
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‘in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens,’ and as vehicles for 
‘inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political 
system.’”126  Justice Brennan of course is not making a novel claim about the 
democratizing role of the public schools,127 so I want to focus here not on his claim about 
the public schools but on his understanding of private schooling.  In contrast to the 
democratic values promoted in the public schools, religious schools, Justice Brennan 
argues, “offer[] values of [their] own.”128 Undoubtedly religious schools do offer values, 
i.e., religious values, not found in the public schools.  Presumably this is the very reason 
for their existence.  But is it the case that simply because religion is part of the experience 
of religious schooling that such schools serve no public function, that they do not also 
inculcate “liberal” or “democratic” values such as tolerance and respect for the rights of 
others and a willingness to participate in the nation’s political processes and civil society 
more generally?  Justice Brennan seems to presume that this is the case, as do many 
liberal and democratic theorists who are critical of religious schooling.129  Indeed the very 
labels used to distinguish government schools from and nongovernmental schools—
“public” vs. “private”— signifies this presumption.  It is perhaps telling that advocates of 
this claim do not so much argue that religious schools serve no public function as assert 
it, as the example of Justice Brennan shows.  To state the matter another way, it is 
presumed that as between schooling options,  only government schools impart to rising 
generations the civic values necessary to sustain democracy.130  Religious schools, on the 
126
 Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (citation omitted).
127 See, e.g., Horace Mann, The Republic and the School (Lawrence A. Cremin, ed., 1957 [1837]); and John 
Dewey, Democracy and Education (1963 [1916]). 
128 Abington School District, 374 U.S. at 242 (Brennan, J. concurring).
129 See, e.g., Macedo, supra note 98; and Gutmann, supra note 98.
130 See, e.g., Gutmann, supra note 98, and Benjamin Barber, An Aristocracy of Everyone (1992).
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other hand, are presumed simply to inculcate narrow, sectarian dogmas that contribute 
little to the preservation of our democratic way of life.  We might ask, however: what 
evidence exists to demonstrate that children who attend religious schools do not grow up 
to become tolerant, responsible, law-abiding citizens, who are respectful of the rights of 
others, with the capacity for thinking critically about politics and other matters, who are 
capable of providing for themselves, and who are burdensome neither to their families 
nor to society at large—who do not, in other words, become good democratic citizens?
The question of the degree to which religious schools actually instill important civic 
values in young people is a question that has only recently attracted the attention of 
researchers.  Because it is a question that needs to be studied over a long period of time, 
no ultimate conclusion has yet been reached.  However, the extant research runs against 
the long-held presumption that public schools outperform religious schools in inculcating 
civic values.131  In other words, evidence is mounting that religious schools are no less 
effective, and perhaps even are better at, teaching civic values such as tolerance and 
civic-mindedness than are the public schools.  Justice Brennan and others are thus correct 
to note that religious schools have values of their own , i.e., religious values, but are 
wrong to presume that th at is all they have, that they do not contribute to the health and 
maintenance of civil society.  
One might argue, too, that religious schools, indeed all private schools, serve an 
additional public function in easing the enrollment burden on the public school system.  
131 See Patrick J. Wolf, Jay P. Greene, Brett Kleitz, and Kristina Thalhammer, Private Schooling and 
Political Tolerance, in Charters, Vouchers and Public Education 268 (Paul E. Peterson and David E. 
Campbell, eds., 2001) and Jay P. Greene, Civic Values in Public and Private Schools, in Learning from 
School Choice 83 (Paul E. Peterson and Bryan C. Hassel, eds., 1998).  These studies do not distinguish 
between private religious schooling and private non-religious schooling.  However, because most private 
schooling in this country is religious in character, to speak of private schooling is to speak essentially of 
religious schooling.  See supra note 106.
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Take the 2000-2001 academic year as an example.  The U.S. Department of Education’s 
National Center for Education Statistics estimates that over five million students were 
educated in private schools during 2000-2001.132 While the precise amount is difficult to 
quantify, private schooling undoubtedly saves government—local, state, and national—
millions of dollars annually by lessening the need for additional tax monies that would 
otherwise be needed for the public system to educate millions of more students.133  In this 
regard, recall that one of the legislative motivations for the tuition reimbursement and tax 
credit plans declared unconstitutional in Committee for Public Education & Religious 
Liberty v Nyquist134 was the fear that “any ‘precipitous decline in the number of non-
public school pupils would cause a massive increase in public school enrollment and 
costs,’ an increase that would ‘aggravate an already serious fiscal crisis in public 
education [in New York state]’ and would ‘seriously jeopardize quality education for all 
children.’”135 Quite apart from the civic education function of private schools, then, such 
schools would seem also to serve the public good by the benefit they provide by
alleviating public school enrollment burdens, and correspondent financial obligations.  
This fact, along with the civic education accomplishments of private schools, thus call 
into question the presumption that “private” schooling serves only narrow, sectarian 
interests. 
What then can be said about the understanding of liberalism underlying the public 
school cases?  For different reasons, the belief that the state should not promote religion 
132 See supra note 106.
133 See Michael W. McConnell and Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious 
Freedom, University of Chicago Law Review 56: 1, 23-25 (1989).     
134
 413 U.S. 756 (1973).  Nyquist also struck down public grants to religious schools for the maintenance 
and repair of facilities and equipment.  Id.  at 774-777.
135 Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 765 (citation omitted).
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is consistent with both autonomy-centered liberalism and diversity-centered liberalism.  
Unlike the opinions in the public assistance cases, however, which appear to bear a closer 
resemblance to Galston’s two concepts of liberalism, the similarities, if any, in the public 
school cases are less apparent.  As I suggested, perhaps the strongest similarity to 
Galston’s taxonomy is the public school cases is the notion that public schooling rests 
upon and serves broad, near-universal principles while religious schooling serves only 
narrow, sectarian interests.  Although this view appears to have a low regard for
diversity—the liberty interests of parents in raising and educating their children as they 
generally see fit requires the state, per Pierce v. Society of Sisters,136 to tolerate religious 
schooling, even as these schools serve only narrow religious interests—it does not 
necessarily point in the direction of autonomy-centered liberalism.  To be sure, 
autonomy-centered liberals argue that that public schooling should be a vehicle for 
educating children away from inherited religious beliefs toward notions of autonomous 
self-direction,137 but the Supreme Court itself has not gone this far.  This is not to ignore 
the fact that Justice Stevens suggests that public schooling should be an instrument for 
educating children away from inherited religious beliefs,138 but among Supreme Court 
justices, he appears to be alone in this view.  
136
 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
137 See Gutmann, supra note 98.
138 Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 711 (1994) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (In Kiryas Joel the Court declared unconstitutional on establishment clause 
grounds the establishment of a public school district that coincided with the boundaries of Kiryas Joel, a 
village in Orange County, New York, populated entirely by Satmar Hasidic Jews.)
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IV.  Conclusion
The conflict within the liberal political tradition between the principles of 
autonomy and diversity that Galston describes seems present, if sometimes only faintly,
in the Supreme Court’s judgments about the place of religion in public life as regards the 
education of children.  The main challenge of discerning just what understanding of 
liberalism, if any, animates the Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence lies in the fact
that Supreme Court justices simply are not very reflective or philosophical in their 
opinion-writing.  Neither those justices who have sought and seek to secularize the public 
sphere nor those justices who have resisted this goal betray much philosophical insight.
Even so, there seems to be more than a passing resemblance between autonomy-centered 
liberalism and the opinions of those justices who believe religion should be restricted to 
the private sphere.  The similarity is most apparent in the public assistance cases, where 
the privatization commitment is paired with a negative appraisal of religion.  One finds 
indications that autonomy-centered liberalism also underlies the public school decisions, 
but the evidence here—the assumption that religious schooling serves no public function 
or does not contribute to the public good—is less distinct than in the public assistance 
cases.    
That the contexts are different helps explain why autonomy-centered liberalism is 
more evident in the public assistance cases than in the pubic schooling cases.  As I noted, 
the practices that have been declared unconstitutional in the public schooling cases 
unavoidably involved the state in the promotion of religion.  Consequently, little in the 
way of explanation is given, or perhaps even needed, to conclude that the state should not 
promote religion.  This contrasts with the public assistance cases where neutrally 
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available programs leave beneficiaries free to choose between secular and religious 
alternatives, thereby severing the link between the state and religion. Still another 
possibility as to why autonomy-centered liberalism is more pronounced in the public 
assistance cases, even if not all that robust, is that the Court is sharply divided in these 
cases, especially recently.  As the privatization of religion position has become the 
minority view, justices writing in this vein have been moved to write lengthy dissents 
explaining just why religion should be limited to the private realm.  In doing so, the 
affinity to autonomy-centered liberalism has become more apparent.
Diversity-centered liberalism, on the other hand, is reflected—not perfectly or 
fully but is suggested—in the conception of neutrality that now commands the support of 
a slim majority of justices in the public assistance cases.  A law is now considered neutral 
if it neither defines recipients on the basis of religion nor attempts to channel them 
toward the religious alternative.  Under such a program, public money that ends up 
supporting religion does so not because the government has acted to advance religion, but 
because individual recipients prefer the religious alternative over the secular one.  This 
understanding of government neutrality evinces far more respect for our nation’s 
religious diversity than does the belief that religion is to be confined to the private sphere.  
It seems to me, moreover, that it is a better, more accurate understanding of neutrality.  
The older understanding, associated with a commitment to secularizing the public sphere, 
inexplicably holds, or even fails to recognize, that the establishment of a government-
owned, compulsory, secular educational system means that the state is anything but 
neutral with respect to religion.  Though the newer understanding of neutrality seems to 
be genuinely neutral as between religion and non-religion, its application is limited to the 
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public assistance cases.  Public schooling simply is not a neutrally available public 
program that leaves parents to choose between secular and religious alternatives.  
A way to summarize the Court’s religion and schooling establishment clause 
jurisprudence would be to note that from the beginning of the Court’s religion clause 
jurisprudence in the middle of the twentieth century until roughly about the time of the
ascendancy of William Rehnquist to the chief justice position, the Court generally sought 
to confine religion to the private sphere, or to secularize the public sphere.  In these 
opinions, autonomy-centered liberalism, or at least hints of it, is evident.  As the makeup 
of the Court has changed in recent decades, a jurisprudence more akin to diversity-
centered liberalism has emerged, as least as measured by the neutral aid cases.  Evidence 
suggestive of this is the fact that the aim in recent aid cases is not to restrict religion to 
the private sphere but to ensure simply that the state does not directly promote religion.
The differing views on religion’s place in society, and the appropriate posture of 
the state vis-à-vis religion, that are found in the Court’s establishment clause 
jurisprudence thus contains tensions similar, if sometimes only faintly, to those found in 
the conflict between autonomy-centered liberalism and diversity-centered liberalism.  In 
other words, just as the conflict between autonomy-centered liberalism and diversity-
centered liberalism is a debate about the meaning of the liberal political tradition and the 
place of religion, so too is the constitutional debate over the meaning of the establishment 
clause fundamentally a debate over the nature of the liberal political tradition itself.
Writing for the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, Chief Justice Burger observed that the Court 
“could only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation” drawn by the establishment 
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clause.139  However dim the Court’s perception of the just boundary between religion and 
the state may be, its marking of the boundary, circuitous and winding as it has been, 
parallels at least in outline form the conflict between autonomy-centered liberalism and 
diversity-centered liberalism. The conflicts within the Supreme Court’s establishment 
clause jurisprudence then seem also to be largely about the meaning of the liberal 
political tradition and the place of religion in it.   
139 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
